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Introduction
* Firms often market their goods by offering a menu of choices: consumers may choose between goods with different quality, or between packages containing different quantities of the same good. It allows the firm to price discriminate when demand is heterogeneous, but any individual consumer's demand is not observable. This practice, known as second-degree price discrimination, has been studied extensively in the literature (see, for instance, Mussa and Rosen, 1978; Maskin and Riley, 1984; and Wilson, 1992) . Surprisingly, however, no model unambiguously predicts such a common phenomenon as quantity discounts, which always come at the price of restrictions on the parameters. The analysis in this article reveals that this shortcoming is due to the incomplete modelling of consumer behavior.
An assumption invariably found in previous articles is that consumers may only pick one single item, or bundle, from the menu offered by the firm. In reality, consumers often have access to other forms of arbitrage: for many goods, they can buy several bundles from the menu, share a bundle with other consumers, or do both. This article characterizes the price schedule that maximizes a monopolist's expected profit when is distorted downward compared to the socially efficient level. This similarity is related to the intuition developed above: in both the single-bundle and the multiple-purchase cases, only the high-valuation consumer may consume less than the bundle meant for him through arbitrage: in one case by buying the small bundle, in the other by buying several small bundles. Therefore, only the high-valuation consumer obtains a rent. And as in the single-bundle case, to limit this rent the monopolist distorts the quantity offered to the low-valuation consumer downward compared to the socially optimal level. The quantity may, however, be more or less distorted than in the single-bundle model. When it is less distorted, total welfare and the high-valuation consumer's utility is higher. In contrast, when the distortion is larger, total welfare is smaller, and the high-valuation consumer's utility may in fact be lower than in the single-bundle model. But the firm's expected profit is always smaller.
A striking result is that the amount of discrimination, measured by the difference in the unit price in the small and large bundles, may be higher than in the singlebundle model. This is at first sight counterintuitive: intuition would suggest that better consumer arbitrage reduces the firm's ability to price discriminate. Nevertheless, the result is quite natural: given that quantity discounts are not sufficient to prevent multiple purchases, it follows that a way to prevent them is to further increase the discount.
Finally, I confirm that quantity premia are not feasible when consumers can make multiple purchases. Surprisingly, however, strict quantity discounts are always optimal. It is surprising because the following argument seems natural: if it is optimal for the firm to impose a quantity premium at the single-bundle solution, then the infeasibility of quantity premia through multiple purchases should imply that the firm offers a linear price scheme, i.e., both types of consumers pay the same unit price. The intuition behind the strict discount result is as follows. Given a linear price and multiple purchases, the firm cannot force the high-valuation consumer to purchase a bundle that is not on his demand curve. Moreover, the price must exceed marginal cost (otherwise, the firm would not be a monopolist). Thus with a linear price, the high-valuation consumer would choose a socially suboptimal quantity. Clearly, then, the firm can increase its profit by increasing the quantity and decreasing the price in the large bundle: total welfare increases, whereas the high-valuation consumer's utility is unaffected.
Turning to the effects of joint purchases only, the results are qualitatively different compared to the single-bundle and the multiple-purchase cases. First, the low-valuation consumer obtains a strictly positive utility. As opposed to the single-bundle and multiplepurchase cases, the low-valuation consumer is here an active arbitrageur: he may indeed consume less than the small bundle by sharing a bundle with others. Being an active arbitrageur, he obtains a rent. Second, joint purchases prevent the monopolist from imposing an implicit unit price exceeding marginal utility, in contrast with the singlebundle and multiple-purchase cases. If the firm were to impose such a price, the consumers would simply make joint purchases in order to diminish their consumption to the point where unit price equalled marginal utility. As a consequence, the monopolist must offer bundles along the respective demand curves, in contrast with the singlebundle and multiple-purchase cases. Note that this further implies socially suboptimal quantities to both types of consumers. The firm being a monopolist, it will set the average unit prices above marginal cost. Social inefficiency then follows from the fact that the bundles are on the demand curves, i.e., that average unit price equals marginal utility for both types of consumers.
As in the multiple-purchase case, the firm is worse off with joint purchases than in the single-bundle case, and the high-valuation consumer may be worse or better off. Furthermore, the intuition that joint purchases preclude quantity discounts is formally confirmed. Hence, put together, multiple and joint purchases make any price discrimination infeasible. Nevertheless, an important conclusion is that if arbitrage is not perfect in the sense that either multiple or joint purchases are not possible consumer actions, the monopolist can price discriminate and may even discriminate more than in the single-bundle case.
The related literature is small, and it deals with quite distinct problems. McManus (1998) provides an analysis of two-part tariffs, when a high-demand and a low-demand consumer can cooperate in order to pay the fixed fee only once. In contrast with my results, the firm is almost always better off when the consumers can cooperate. The reason is simple: when consumers of different types can cooperate (which is not the case in my model), the firm can set the fixed fee equal to the sum of the gross surpluses, whereas without consumer arbitrage, the fee cannot exceed the smallest of these surpluses. Further, Innes and Sexton (1993 , 1994 , 1996 study the issue of coalition formation among consumers, but in a very different context. The threat of the coalitions is to set up their own production units in order to compete with the monopolist. Consumers are supposed to be homogeneous, implying that nondiscrimination is optimal when there is no threat of collusion. A central result of Innes and Sexton's research is that price discrimination emerges as the optimal way to prevent collusion between consumers. Finally, Hammond (1987) shows in a general equilibrium model that goods that are exchangeable between consumers must be sold at linear prices: the exchangeability allows consumers to equalize their marginal rates of substitution. In contrast with that model, the present approach allows for a more detailed analysis by making a distinction between multiple and joint purchases.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the single-bundle model and shows that it may not be robust to multiple and joint purchases. Section 3 characterizes the profit-maximizing price scheme when consumers have access to multiple purchases only, and compares it to the single-bundle solution. Section 4 first allows for joint purchases only, then for both multiple and joint purchases. Section 5 provides a conclusion and relates some empirical evidence to the results.
The single-bundle model: results and properties
* Consider a monopolist who produces a good at constant marginal cost c > 0. The market for the good consists of a large number of consumers (normalized to a continuum with mass 1). Consumers have heterogeneous tastes. A consumer of type 0 derives net surplus U(O, q, t) = OV(q) -t from consuming a bundle with q units of the good at total price t. An alternative interpretation is that q stands for the quality of the good, sold in single units.2 V is a twice continuously differentiable and strictly concave function defined on [0, 0o), with V(O) = 0, V' > 0, V" < 0. For each consumer, the parameter 0 takes the value 0 > 0 with probability a, and the value 0 > 0 with probability (1 -a). There is thus a proportion a of low-valuation consumers and a proportion 1 -a of high-valuation consumers. In equilibrium the monopolist offers two bundles, denoted {q, t} and { q, t}, the former being meant for the low-valuation consumer and the latter for the high-valuation consumer. Further, let p= tlq and p-i = Iq denote the implicit unit prices.
The feature that renders the firm's problem nontrivial is the crucial, and plausible, assumption that an individual consumer's valuation 0 is private information. Indeed, 2 At the end of this section I give examples of goods that are relevant for the quantity and the quality interpretations in the single-bundle, multiple-purchase, and joint-purchase cases.
otherwise the monopolist would choose the quantity that maximizes the social surplus OV(q) -cq and extract the whole surplus from the consumer by setting t(q) = OV(q).
Let q* and q* denote the first-best consumption levels, i.e., OV'(q*) -c and OV'(q*) = c. Figure 1 shows the complete-information solution, with Q* and Q* denoting the respective bundles. In the figure, the indifference curves corresponding to zero utility for both types of consumers are drawn. Note that since utility is increasing in q and decreasing in t, points below an indifference curve strictly dominate those on the curve. Further, note that the slope of the line passing through the origin and a given bundle is the unit price implicit for that bundle. Given that 0 is private information, full rent extraction with socially optimal quantities is not an implementable scheme. For instance, a consumer of type 0 strictly prefers the bundle {q, t} = {q*u OV(q*)} to the bundle {*qu OV(q*)}.
In the single-bundle model, the consumer has two options: choose one bundle or the other. Given this type of arbitrage, it is easy to show that it is optimal for the monopolist to deter the high-valuation consumer from choosing the low-valuation consumer's bundle (and vice versa). The bundles that maximize the firm's expected profit a(t -cq) + (1 -a)(i -cq) are such that the incentive constraint for the high-valuation consumer (1) and the participation constraint for the low-valuation consumer (2) are binding.
OV(i) -'OV(q)-t
(1)
The high-valuation consumer thus obtains a rent equal to (0-O)V(q). The firm makes a first-order gain by reducing this rent, at a second-order cost of reducing q compared to the first-best q*. More precisely, the quantity offered to the low-valuation consumer, qS, is defined by the following expression, where the superscript s stands for single-bundle: This is not very surprising per se although it indicates that modelling multiple and joint purchases is called for. Figure 2 , however, allows for a more surprising conclusion: Observation 2. A decreasing average unit price is not sufficient to prevent multiple purchases. Similarly, an increasing average unit price is not sufficient to prevent joint purchases. Figure 2 , the average unit price is decreasing (js < ps). Nevertheless, the high-valuation consumer prefers to buy two small bundles (be at M in the figure) to buying one large bundle (be at H). Clearly, then, subadditivity is not sufficient to prevent multiple purchases of the small bundle. Further, note that the low-valuation consumer prefers to share a small bundle with another consumer (be at J) to buying a whole small bundle (be at L). Note also that this is true independently of ps, and hence even if there is a quantity premium, js > ps. This is not particular to the discrete case: in the single-bundle model with a continuum of types, a decreasing average unit price is implied by a nondecreasing hazard rate for the distribution of types; although this is a common feature of many distributions, it is still a restriction.
Indeed, in
Observation 2 indicates that consumers do not arbitrage only to obtain the good at the lowest unit price. The key to understanding the above observation is that when a firm offers bundles as opposed to setting prices and letting the consumers choose the quantities, it seeks to offer bundles that are above the demand curve, i.e., such that the average unit price exceeds marginal utility. In Figure 2 , at H the slope of the highvaluation consumer's indifference curve (i.e., the consumer's marginal utility) is smaller than the slope of the line passing through the origin and H (i.e., the implicit unit price pjs). It follows that a high-valuation consumer would buy less than -q* given the implicit unit price. And he may actually be better off with several small bundles than with the large bundle, even if he pays a higher unit price (of course, he may ultimately prefer sharing a large bundle with other consumers, but that is not relevant here).
Let me briefly comment on the continuum-of-types case in relation to Observation 2. Indeed, under some circumstances a nonincreasing average price is sufficient to prevent multiple purchases with a continuum of types. In particular, that is true if the types are distributed on some interval [0, 0]. To see this, think of the single-bundle solution in that case (see Maskin and Riley, 1984, or Tirole, 1988) : under some regularity assumptions, the menu of bundles {q(0), t(0)} is a monotonic function t: [0, q*] -4 R; further, for every type 0, the utility is maximized at {q(0), t(0)}, meaning that the indifference curve of a consumer of type 0 is tangent to t at {q(0), t(0) }. In that case, a nonincreasing average unit price implies that t is concave. Clearly, this is robust to multiple purchases. However, a nonincreasing average price may not be sufficient to prevent multiple purchases if the types are distributed on some interval [0, 0], where 0 > 0. Indeed, in that case a menu of bundles exhibiting quantity discounts is still a concave function, but it does not start at the origin. A consumer with a high 0, say 0, may therefore strictly prefer buying several small bundles to buying the bundle meant for him: indeed, the line from the origin through the smallest bundle on the menu may lie strictly below consumer 0's indifference curve that is tangent to the menu.
Before analyzing the effects of multiple and joint purchases, it is useful to discuss the applicability of the various settings, in particular with respect to the two possible interpretations of q, namely quality and quantity. Let me start with the quantity interpretation. It is difficult to find goods for which neither multiple nor joint purchases are When it comes to the quality interpretation, it is easier to find applications for the single-bundle model: any good for which a consumer typically has a "true" unit demand (i.e., either he buys one unit or no unit at all) is suitable. Cars for everyday use are an example of such a good. Other examples could be computers for everyday extensive use, transportation between city x and y on a certain date by airplane or train, and seats in a theater. In contrast, it is difficult to find relevant examples for multiple purchases as modelled here. Indeed, it requires finding goods for which there is a linear tradeoff between quantity and quality (i.e., consuming two units with quality x is equivalent to consuming one unit with quality 2x). However, such tradeoffs probably do not exist to a significant extent. Indeed, taking wine as an example, a consumer who has developed a taste for quality, and who can afford quality, probably does not even consider that several bottles of low-quality wine could replace one bottle of high-quality wine. Finally, examples of goods worth purchasing jointly, but not multiply, are of two kinds. First, for some goods consumers do not have a true unit demand, because the good is not consumed at all times. Examples include lawn mowers, snow blowers, and swimming pools. Neighbors may quite easily buy these goods jointly.4 The joint purchase implies a saving but does not necessarily imply that a different quality level is purchased than if no joint purchase was made. For the second category, interpret 0 as the income level (see Tirole, 1988) . For people with a low 0, making a joint purchase could be the only way to consume the high-quality good. Taking wine (or any highquality food) as an example, a consumer might wish to but could not afford to spend a thousand dollars alone on an exclusive wine, but he would accept buying the bottle jointly with some friends.
To summarize, for the quantity interpretation of q, both multiple purchases and joint purchases are highly relevant, although for some goods joint purchases are ruled out due to transactions costs. For the quality interpretation, joint purchases seem more relevant than multiple purchases. Further, the single-bundle model appears to apply more easily to the quality than to the quantity interpretation. Keeping these observations in mind, I nonetheless refer only to the quantity interpretation when developing the model below, in order to keep the exposition simple.
3. Multiple purchases * In this section, consumers may make multiple but not joint purchases. If the firm could identify a consumer, it could prevent multiple purchases simply by forbidding them. I therefore assume that purchases are made anonymously, implying that the firm 4Note that there should be significant moral hazard problems connected with such joint purchases. All transactions costs will, however, be disregarded in the model. cannot impose any restriction on the number of bundles bought by any consumer. I also assume that a bundle sold to a consumer cannot depend on the bundles sold to other consumers. These are realistic assumptions for consumer goods. It would be ideal to assume that a consumer can only buy discrete numbers of bundles. However, this turns out to be technically problematic. Therefore, I assume from the start that the consumer can buy any real number (exceeding one) of bundles when making multiple purchases, although I will comment on the integer case at the end of this section. In Figure 1 , all price-quantity combinations on the price lines above Q* and Q*, respectively, are attainable through multiple purchases.
El The profit-maximizing price schedule. To determine the profit-maximizing price schedule, I need to know how the consumers behave in equilibrium: how many bundles will each type of consumer buy? Fortunately, the revelation principle applies here:
given any two bundles {t, q } and {t, q}, and whatever the choice of any type of consumer facing these bundles, the monopolist can redesign the bundles so as to replicate this choice. Therefore, attention can be restricted to bundles such as in equilibrium the high-valuation consumer buys one bundle {t, 4q} and the low-valuation consumer buys one bundle {t, q1. The expected profit of the monopolist is thus5
To ensure the above-described equilibrium behavior, the bundles must satisfy individual-rationality and incentive-compatibility constraints. For a consumer of type 0 to prefer one bundle {q, t} to any number of bundles {q, t} or {q, t}, the following two sets of incentive-compatibility constraints must be respected (in the constraints, k and k' are real numbers):
The first set of constraints ensures that a consumer of type 0 prefers one bundle {q, t} to any number k -1 of bundles {q, t }; the second set ensures that if the same consumer could choose between any other number k ? 1 of bundles {q, t}, he chooses exactly one such bundle; and the third set ensures that the same consumer would not be better off with any combination of the two bundles. Then, for a consumer of type 0 to prefer one bundle {q, t} to any other number of bundles {q, t} or {q, t}, the incentivecompatibility constraints to satisfy are6
It might seem odd to think that the monopolist would prevent a consumer from 5As in the single-bundle case, it is sufficient to assume that a is sufficiently large for the firm to serve the low-valuation consumers, i.e., for q > 0. 
Although the maximization problem seems complex, many constraints can be easily eliminated. As argued in the previous section, the monopolist seeks to offer bundles that are above the demand curves. A declining marginal utility therefore implies that a consumer does not wish to buy multiples of the bundle meant for him (thus eliminating constraints (5) and (8)). Further, it is quite obvious that constraints (6) and (9) are slack: buying only bundles with the lowest average unit price is better than any combination of the two bundles. As described in the proposition below, the two binding constraints are the participation constraint for the low-valuation consumer (11) and one of the incentive-compatibility constraints (7) for the high-valuation consumer, namely the one corresponding to the high-valuation consumer's preferred number of small bundles. In the proposition the superscript m stands for multiple purchases. This rent is increasing in q. Indeed, since the high-valuation consumer is able to purchase any quantity larger than one of the small bundle, the lower the average unit price in the small bundle, the higher his utility. And the implicit unit price in the small bundle is a decreasing function of q, given that the low-valuation consumer's utility is zero and that V is strictly concave. I therefore obtain the following: consuming one bundle, which must be the case for a consumer of type 6 not to choose {q, t}, he would buy an infinite number of bundles, if the rent were linear in k. When consumers can choose their preferred real number of bundles, the quantity in the large bundle can be exactly replicated by a certain number of small bundles, in which case the firm would not sell any large bundles if there were a quantity premium pII < ptl.
Thus, a nonincreasing average unit price is necessary. But the above proposition further indicates that the solution always exhibits strict quantity discounts. This is quite surprising. Indeed, consider parameter values for which the firm imposes quantity premia in the single-bundle model (pS < -s); intuition would suggest that for the same parameter values, the firm would simply sell the good at a linear price p"II = pill when the threat of multiple purchases makes premia infeasible. But as Proposition 3 shows, this is not true. The reason behind this result is that if the firm sells the good at a linear unit price, then the quantity offered to the high-valuation consumer cannot exceed the quantity demanded by that consumer at that price for the multiple-purchase constraints to be satisfied. Therefore, marginal utility exceeds marginal cost, implying that total surplus can be increased by increasing q: by also decreasing j, the consumer's utility can be kept constant, implying that the firm's profit increases. Table 2 . However, it appears not to be generally true, as the second example shows.
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El The integer case. I have partially analyzed the case when consumers can buy only discrete numbers of bundles, and the following summarizes the findings.9 Some of the above results apply. In particular, Proposition 1 is valid as it stands, the only difference being that the preferred number of bundles k*(q) must be an integer. Further, the single-bundle solution may be robust to multiple purchases. Related to this, quantity premia are feasible under some circumstances. To see this, assume that there is a quantity premium and that 0 -0 is small. Then, making a multiple purchase of the small bundle could imply a much larger consumption than with one large bundle. If p -p is small enough, the high-valuation consumer prefers the large bundle to two or more small bundles. Turning to the quantities, there is no distortion at the top (q = q*); the determination of q is problematic, since it involves differentiating k*(q). Interestingly, intuition suggests that q may be distorted upward. To see this, set the quantity in the small bundle to q* and assume that the high-valuation consumer then prefers two small bundles to one large, but that a small increase of q implies that he prefers the large bundle to two small ones. This remains to be formally confirmed, however.
Multiple and joint purchases
* I start this section with an analysis of the effects of joint purchases alone, assuming that multiple purchases are not possible. Then I proceed to the case in which both joint and multiple purchases are possible consumer actions. El Joint purchases only. A joint purchase occurs when a group of consumers buys one or more bundles to divide among themselves. In reality, consumers' access to joint purchases depends on a number of factors, e.g., the information consumers have about each other, the number of consumers, transactions costs, etc. For simplicity I disregard these factors. First, I assume that every consumer knows that the other consumers exist, as well as their types. Second, I disregard transactions costs.10 Third, I impose one restriction on the joint-purchase possibilities: I assume that only consumers of the same type make joint purchases. This simplifies the analysis, since I need not define how consumers of different types share bundles. Moreover, the assumption is realistic in many circumstances; neighbors buying a good jointly are more likely than not to have approximately the same income level (as noted above, the different types can indeed be interpreted as representing different income levels). Together with the assumption that there is a continuum of consumers, these assumptions imply that a consumer may effectively consume any fraction of any bundle by making a joint purchase with the other consumers of the same type. In Figure 1 , with joint purchases a consumer has access to any price-quantity combination on the lines between the origin and Q*, and between the origin and Q*, respectively.
As in the multiple-purchase case, it is easy to verify that the revelation principle holds, implying that standard techniques may be used to characterize the profitmaximizing price schedule.1 1 The monopolist can therefore restrict attention to bundles it, q) and {t, 4q such that in equilibrium a low-valuation consumer buys the former bundle and the high-valuation consumer buys the latter bundle. For this to be the equilibrium behavior, each type of consumer must prefer buying the bundle meant for his type to any fraction of any bundle. Thus, the following incentive-compatibility constraints must be satisfied. 
Note that multiple purchases are ruled out since n, n' : 1. Together with the participation constraints (10) and (1 1), the incentive constraints define the set of feasible bundles. The firm's objective is to find the pair of bundles in that set which maximizes the expected profit: a(t -cq) + (1 -a)(t -cq).
The following result, which is qualitatively different from the single-bundle solution, is immediate: Interestingly, and in contrast with the single-bundle and multiple-purchase cases, joint purchases prevent the monopolist from offering bundles that are not on the demand curve. This is easily understood, however: given that any fraction of any bundle is attainable through joint purchases, if the implicit unit price exceeds marginal utility, the consumers will simply make joint purchases to reduce their consumption to the point where unit price equals marginal utility. Joint purchases thus take us back to the usual monopoly-pricing model, the specificity here being that there are two demand curves.13 Therefore I find the regular monopoly-pricing solution if the incentive constraint, i.e., constraint (15) n = 1, is not violated at that solution: the unit price charged to a consumer is defined by the Lerner index, and the consumer gets the quantity at which his marginal utility equals the unit price.
Finally, as in the usual monopoly-pricing model, the production levels are suboptimal (both quantities are distorted downward compared to the first best). It should be noted, however, that the distortion at the top, -q < q*, is a very unusual feature for this type of hidden-information model. The distortion is explained by the usual rentefficiency tradeoff: the rent obtained by the high-valuation consumer is increasing in q; distorting -q slightly induces a second-order loss for the monopolist but allows a first-order gain, namely to increase the extracted surplus. The fact that the rent is increasing in -q follows from the tangency of the indifference curve with the price line, together with the strict concavity of V.
As in the multiple-purchase model, one can use a simple revealed preference argument to show that the firm's profit is higher given the single-bundle solution than with the joint-purchase solution. However, it is not clear whether total welfare is higher or lower than in the single-bundle case. There is a welfare loss in that the large quantity q is socially suboptimal when joint purchases are possible, but the low-valuation consumer's quantity may be less distorted than in the single-bundle case. It is not excluded that this lesser distortion may offset the welfare loss due to the distortion of the large quantity, although I have not found a numerical example corroborating this. In the '3 Note that if the high-valuation consumer strictly prefers the large to the small bundle (i.e., if the "classical" incentive constraint is not binding), the solution is actually the third-degree price discrimination solution, the difference being that there is no external distinction between the different types of consumers here. numerical examples in Table 3 , total expected welfare (TEW) is therefore lower in the joint-purchase than in the single-bundle case. Interestingly, the high-valuation consumer's utility U may be higher or lower. Also, the amount of price discrimination here is higher with than without joint purchases.
That the firm is worse off with than without joint purchases contrasts with McManus's (1998) analysis: he finds that the firm may be better off when consumers can make joint purchases by agreeing to pay the fixed fee only once in a two-part tariff setting. The reason is that McManus allows for joint purchases between consumers of different types, whereas I do not; in my model, the bundles therefore need to satisfy participation constraints for each type of consumer, whereas in the framework of McManus, there is only a participation constraint for the coalition of consumers. In McManus's model the firm can therefore extract a larger surplus.
El
The finite case. The following discussion is intended to provide some insights into the modelling of joint purchases with a finite number of consumers. A modeller must consider the following three issues, each of them with a number of alternate routes.
First, one may or may not allow for joint purchases made by consumers of different types. Although allowing for them could add realism to the model, I believe this would make it more complex without yielding essential insights. Second, one may or may not take into account transactions costs. Third, and most important, the monopolist's information about realized demand structure may or may not be complete, where complete information means that the monopolist knows the total number of consumers of each type. Since the monopolist does not serve all consumers at once, there is still incomplete information about the type of each consumer. If information is incomplete, the model must settle on one particular form of uncertainty: either the monopolist knows the total number of consumers and the expected distribution of types but not the realized distribution,14 or there is uncertainty about the total number of consumers as well as about the realized distribution of types.
It is tempting to choose one of the incomplete-information settings, for the sake of realism. The analysis of these, however, appears quite complex. I indeed conjecture that the revelation principle does not always apply in an incomplete-information setting. In other words, it may be optimal for the firm to allow for joint purchases in equilibrium. The intuition for this is the following: there exist states in which joint purchases are not relevant'5 or not very costly to prevent.'6 If these states are sufficiently likely, it is probably not profitable to deter joint purchases in all possible states. In contrast, it is easy to verify that it is optimal for the monopolist to deter any joint purchases in the complete-information case. Nevertheless, the complete-information case is not simple either. I have analyzed the case in which the monopolist knows there are two consumers of each type, assuming that only consumers of the same type make joint purchases. In that setting, any consumer has four alternatives: one small bundle, one large bundle, half a small bundle, and half a large bundle. The main insights from the analysis are the following. First, the low-valuation consumer obtains a strictly positive rent (the proof of Proposition 5 ALGER I 753 the previous literature. Interestingly, a more pronounced discrimination does not necessarily imply a lower utility for consumers. Nevertheless, the firm is worse off when consumers can make multiple or joint purchases than when they can pick only one single bundle. Furthermore, and in contrast with earlier literature, the model yields clear predictions for when one should observe quantity and quality discounts or premia. As the following discussion suggests, casual observations and some empirical studies are consistent with the predictions. I first focus on the quantity interpretation and then turn to the quality interpretation of the model.
As argued in Section 2, multiple purchases are always relevant for the quantity interpretation, except when there are physical restrictions. For many consumer goods, joint purchases are ruled out by transactions costs that are high relative to the value of the good. For such goods, the model predicts that quantity discounts should be observed, and that is clearly the case. Further, for goods of higher value, joint purchases are also relevant. Then neither quantity discounts nor quantity premia should be feasible, a prediction that is confirmed for at least some goods: clothes, for instance, are only rarely sold in bundles of more than one unit (those sold in bundles are typically small items like socks). Finally, Wilson (1992) gives several examples of the complex tariffication applied to different utilities, which are goods fitting into the single-bundle framework. They indicate that quantity discounts are observed. It should be noticed, however, that firms mostly offer two-part tariffs instead of menus of bundles for these goods.
When it comes to the quality interpretation, it seems justifiable to believe that a larger quantity of low-quality goods is rarely seen as the equivalent of a high-quality good, making multiple purchases irrelevant. In contrast, joint purchases seem worth contemplating for many goods, such as large consumer durables or high-quality food or drinks. For these goods, the model predicts quality premia. Further, there are many goods for which the single-bundle model applies. These goods may be sold with either quality discounts or quality premia, according to the model. The only empirical studies I am aware of indicate quality premia: Kwoka (1992) analyzes car prices in the United States, and Sallstrom (1991) investigates jam prices in Sweden. Further, let me cite two examples that are meant to support my belief that quality premia are not uncommon: the price differential for airline tickets in first class and economy class seems to be larger than the objective quality differential; a dress sold by some known designer as part of a haute couture line may be 10 or 30 times more expensive than a dress made by the same designer for the pret-a-porter line, whereas the objective quality difference may be negligeable. There are, however, obvious problems when it comes to measuring quality objectively, and further empirical studies are called for to establish a body of stylized facts.
The model in this article was set in a world with two types of consumers. It would of course be interesting to check whether the results hold with a continuum of types. Further, as suggested in the previous section, the results under joint purchases are expected to be altered if the coalition formation among consumers is modelled differently. That issue deserves further investigation.
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average unit prices in the two bundles are different, then buying only bundles with the lowest average unit price is strictly better than any combination of the two bundles; and if the average unit prices are the same, any combination of the two bundles can be replicated by a certain number of only one type of bundle. Further, constraints (4), k > 1, do not bind either. Indeed, given that (4), k = 1, is satisfied, strict concavity of V implies that these constraints are satisfied with slack. To summarize, the following constraints remain: (11), (5), (7), and (8) for k > 1, and (4) for k = 1.
Suppose that the constraints (4) for k = 1, (5) for k > 1, and (8) for k > 1 are slack. This will be verified below. Then (11) is binding and there remains only one set of incentive-compatibility constraints, namely, (7), k 2 1, which can now be written The last term of the second equation is equal to zero from the definition of k*(q) (see the proof of Proposition 1), so the expression in the proposition obtains.
